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In this article the author discusses recent developments in
workmen's compensation law. Topics include the payment of
attorney's fees, the right to compensation benefits and new
changes in the workmen's compensation rules of procedure.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Updating the area of the workmen's compensation law can best
be achieved by discussing the predominant areas of recent atten-
tion. It is to be noted that in recent years significant decisional law
has emanated from the Industrial Relations Commission.' This re-
sults from the enhanced judicial decisionmaking procedures of that
forum. The Supreme Court of Florida, in Scholastic Systems, Inc.
* Partner in the firm of Keyfetz & Poses, Miami, Florida. J.D., Harvard Law School;
admitted to practice in Florida, New York and Massachusetts; Chairman, Section on Work-
men's Compensation, Florida Bar Association; Associate Editor, Academy of Florida Trial
Lawyers Journal.
1. Written decisions of the Industrial Relations Commission are reprinted and distri-
buted by that body through a decisional law service. The suffix (S) involving an Industrial
Relations Commission decision stands for "Survived" reflecting the fact that neither party
sought review by the Supreme Court of Florida or agreed to dismissal of any proceedings
sought. Where no supreme court proceedings have taken place and the-suffix (S) is absent,
the case reported may still be pending for review in the supreme court. Selected decisions of
the Industrial Relations Commission and its predecessor are also reported in Florida Compen-
sation Reports.
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v. LeLoup, has recognized this and thus defers to Industrial Rela-
tions Commission decisions:
IRC cases shall thereafter be reviewed by this Court upon
traditional certiorari grounds based upon a departure from the
essential requirements of law, rather than upon general appellate
considerations. Appellate review shall be solely for the IRC, with
review only in the Florida Supreme Court upon traditional cer-
tiorari grounds upon a failure to conform to the essential require-
ments of law below.2
It is unclear what legal effect Scholastic Systems, Inc. will have
except that the decision provides a vehicle for justifying the grant-
ing or denying certiorari depending upon the court's desire to make
a pronouncement in a particular case. Certiorari has always been
granted or denied on the grounds that the decision below did not
conform to the essential requirements of law. However, neither
Scholastic Systems, Inc. nor any subsequent decisions have an-
nounced any specific definition of the essential requirements of law.
Accordingly, there appears to be no legal change limiting the
jurisdiction of the court, although there unquestionably was an an-
nounced philosophical change in that the court intended to limit the
scope of review in workmen's compensation cases.
Thus, there appears to be no definable legal standard regard-
ing involvement by the court. Accordingly, the primary decisional
law is left to determination by the Industrial Relations Commission.
The Supreme Court of Florida shall become involved only where
the court deems it appropriate to apply its sense of "law" or "jus-
tice" to the determination in any particular case. It is, therefore,
appropriate that the primary decisional law discussed is that of the
Industrial Relations Commission.
II. ATrORNEY's FEES
Questions concerning attorney's fees in workmen's compensa-
tion cases basically revolve around issues as to (1) entitlement; (2)
amount; (3) findings and sufficiency of the evidence; and (4) bene-
fits considered. As a general observation, it seems apparent that
decisional law is formulating more realistic guidelines regarding the
issue of entitlement by liberally construing the concept of benefits.
2. Scholastic Systems, Inc. v. LeLoup, 307 So. 2d 166, 173 (Fla. 1974). See Vargas v.
Americana of Bal Harbour, 345 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 1977) wherein the court held that an
evaluation as to the extent of the sufficiency of fact finding by the trial judge is better left to
the decision of the Industrial Relations Commission even though the result reached by the
trial judge may be supported by competent substantial evidence.
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Correspondingly, there now seems to be closer scrutiny of the
amount, the sufficiency of evidence and findings in connection
therewith, and the action of counsel in actually precipitating pay-
ment.
A. Entitlement
Under the applicable statute, attorney's fees are due if: (1) the
employer or carrier files notice of controversy as provided in section
440.20 of the Florida Statutes (1977), or (2) declines to pay a claim
on or before the twenty-first day after they have notice of it, or (3)
otherwise resists unsuccessfully the payment of compensation. The
first category is rare and, until recent decisions, the last category
had not been utilized. The result was an almost exclusive use of the
second category which led to an unfortunate rigidity, since in deter-
mining entitlement, the twenty-one day limit has been strictly ap-
plied. Recent decisional law seems to be effectuating the purposes
of the attorney's fee section more realistically through increased
reliance upon the third category and a reevaluation of the applica-
tion of the second category.
Thus, an attorney's fee was held due where, for a period of over
one year, the employer insisted that the claimant's disability was
personal rather than industrial even though the claim was paid
within twenty-one days of its filing.' Without articulating the spe-
cific statutory basis therefor, it was held that an award of an attor-
ney's fee was appropriate.' Because the benefits were paid within
twenty-one days of the filing of the claim, the second above-noted
category, under established law, would not have been the appropri-
ate basis for awarding attorney's fees.' The opinion apparently
rested upon the nonarticulated statutory basis of otherwise unsuc-
cessfully resisting the payment of compensation (since the claimant
was forced to seek an attorney due to the employer's insistence that
the claim was personal). This statutory basis for awarding attor-
ney's fees was specifically articulated in a later case where the car-
rier advised the claimant that benefits were being suspended, but
within twenty-one days of the filing of a claim, the carrier reversed
3. FLA. STAT. § 440.34 (1977).
4. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Dorminey, I.R.C. Order 2-2988 (Fla. Indus. Rel.
Comm'n June 30, 1976), cert. dismissed, 348 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1977).
5. Id. at 5.
6. See Carillon Hotel v. Rodriguez, 124 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1960). The court therein construed
the 21-day period as commencing with the actual filing of the claim, not merely when notice
of it was given.
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itself and resumed payments.' The advice that benefits were being
suspended was held to fall within the category of otherwise unsuc-
cessfully resisting the payment of compensation thereafter agreed to
be due.8
Along with the newly applied third category, there has been
new scrutiny of the second category. The prelude to these recent
decisions was the case of Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. Branch,9
where it was held that no attorney's fee was due when the claimant's
physician delayed one and one-half months in reporting claimant's
disability to the carrier, which upon receipt of the report, accepted
liability for payment of benefits even though payment did not occur
within twenty-one days of the physician's examination.'" After
Branch, a number of decisions have held that the carrier has
twenty-one days from notice of permanent partial disability or per-
manent total disability in which to accept liability for payment of
benefits." The decisions, on their face, seem to relieve the employer-
carrier from the duty to investigate promptly and to pay appropriate
benefits. However, it is unclear from the reported facts the extent
to which, if at all, these decisions directly overrule previous pro-
nouncements which had placed such a duty on the employer-carrier.
The result may be dependent upon the action or inaction of counsel
7. Florida Dep't of Commerce v. Fields, I.R.C. Order 2-3140 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n
Apr. 21, 1977)(S).
8. Id. at 4.
9. 319 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1975).
10. Id. at 14; cf. Davis v. Edwin M. Green, Inc., 240 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1970) (attorney's fees
awarded even though partial payment within 21 days). In Davis, the carrier was paying
benefits for 23% permanent disability of one eye, whereas claimant contended he was entitled
to benefits for a total loss of vision. Claimant's counsel arranged for two hearings which were
postponed by the employer. A few days before the third scheduled hearing, claimant's counsel
deposed the employer's physician who confirmed that the loss of vision was total. Benefits
for a total loss were accepted the following day with the employer contending no fee was due.
Obviously, claimant's counsel in the context of that case was instrumental in breaching what
the court termed the "wall of the willful ignorance." The court noted, "[tihe Florida Work-
men's Compensation Law does not contemplate that an employer may insulate itself from
knowledge that benefits may be due to a claimant and then, when its wall of willful ignorance
is breached by claimant's attorney, commence 'voluntary' payments and resist payment of
attorneys' fees." 240 So. 2d at 5. Of note is the short period of time which elapsed in the
Branch case and the fact that the carrier there was not charged with knowledge that some
investigation was necessary. But see Spencer v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 3 F.C.R. 112 (Fla.
Indus. Rel. Comm'n 1958) wherein five months had elapsed and the dmployer-carrier was
charged with responsibility for investigating claimant's permanent disability.
11. Jones Miami Beach Express v. Mula, I.R.C. Order 2-3245 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n
Oct. 3, 1977); Central Heating & Air Cond. v. Harrison, I.R.C. Order 2.3242 (Fla. Indus. Rel.
Comm'n Sept. 30, 1977)(S); Nick Bruno Transp. & Brokers, Inc. v. White, I.R.C. Order 2-
3202 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n July 22, 1977), cert. denied, 358 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978); W.L.
Sherrod Lumber Co. v. Hall, I.R.C. Order 2-3201 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n July 21, 1977),
cert. dismissed, 345 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1977).
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for claimant."2 Also, the extent to which the carrier is viewed as
promptly investigating and paying under one classification of disa-
bility may depend upon whether benefits are being provided in good
faith under an erroneous classification. Consistent with the pur-
poses of the workmen's compensation law, a somewhat lesser bur-
den to investigate and promptly pay could be imposed in a situation
where benefits are being provided, but under the wrong classifica-
tion.
B. Amount
Guidelines regarding the amount of an attorney's fee were codi-
fied by the 1977 Florida Legislature. 3 The recommended amounts
are twenty-five percent of the first $5,000 of benefits obtained,
twenty percent of the next $5,000 of benefits and fifteen percent of
the remaining amount.. It is further provided that the trial judge
may increase or decrease the fee awarded upon consideration of
enumerated factors. These are the same factors set forth in the
Canons of Ethics4 for determining the amount of a reasonable attor-
ney's fee.
The trial judge has a reasonable amount of discretion in deter-
mining a reasonable attorney's fee in any particular case. However,
it is apparent from the decisions that high attorney's fees are now
closely scrutinized and a finding that the fee granted is reasonable
may depend upon the adequacy of the evidence and findings by the
judge.
In the recent leading decision of Burk Construction Corp. v.
Terrible, ' the Industrial Relations Commission reversed the award
of a $25,000 attorney's fee. The award was in accordance with the
only evidence presented, which was testimony of an expert witness
offered by the claimant. Though the order did not set forth any
evidentiary basis which justified the amount of the fee, it summarily
required the employer-carrier to pay an attorney's fee in the amount
of $25,000. The Industrial Relations Commission noted that the
employer-carrier comes before a reviewing tribunal in a poor posture
to attack the award where no controverting evidence has been pre-
12. Fields v. Cooper, I.R.C. Order 2-3198 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n July 18, 1977)(S).
13. FLA. STAT. § 440.34 (1977).
14. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, No. 2.
15. I.R.C. Order 2-2863 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Oct. 30, 1975). After remand, an order
subsequently awarded $24,000 in attorney's fees. Upon review the Industrial Relations Com-
mission said that, considering the amount of time invested in the case, the award shocked
the conscience. Burk Constr. Corp. v. Terrible, I.R.C. Order 2-3132 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n
Apr. 4, 1977), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1977).
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sented. It was pointed out, however, that the amount of attorney's
fees awarded must still be reasonable in light of the record as a
whole and also in conformity with the evidence. It was thus held
that the amount was excessive based on the whole record, not just
the testimony offered, and the cause was remanded for redetermina-
tion."6
Traditionally, determination as to the amount of a reasonable
attorney's fee had invariably been the function solely of the trial
judge, with the determination being based upon the evidence and
the judge's discretion while looking at the record as a whole. The
judge's determination was then subject to review by an appellate
tribunal. In a unique decision, however, the Industrial Relations
Commission in Somerset Construction v. Valdes 7 held a fee of
$23,000 excessive and then proceeded to set the fee itself. It was held
that $12,500 "would be fair and reasonable compensation to counsel
for claimant."'"
This decision raises a question as to the standard employed on
review by the Industrial Relations Commission in setting attorney's
fees. Will it be: (1) set in accordance with the highest reasonable
amount not shocking to the judicial conscience; or (2) set de novo
in accordance with the reviewing tribunal's view as to a reasonable
fee? It appears the latter process took place in Valdes, but it is
suggested that where the reviewing tribunal is to become involved
in actually establishing the amount of a fee, the former process is
appropriate. Where a reduction is found appropriate on the grounds
that the amount shocks the judicial conscience, the amount should
be reduced to the highest amount that does not shock the reviewing
tribunal's conscience.
In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the amount of time
spent on the case has repeatedly been held to be a significant factor.
How must time is too much for a good lawyer? How should a novice
be compensated when he spends a considerable amount of time
because of his lack of skill? What, if anything, should be done when
a client requires "above-average" time in communicating with the
lawyer about the case? In Valdes, it was noted that the time factor
was inordinately high because the claimant demanded more atten-
tion than the average client and his first counsel was a neophyte. 9
It was held that the parties should not be required to pay for the
16. I.R.C. Order 2-2863 at 11.
17. I.R.C. Order 2-2989 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n June 30, 1976), cert. denied, 345 So.
2d 428 (Fla. 1977).
18. Id. at 5.
19. Id. at 4.
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basic educational process of counsel.
The decision was a precursor to the later decision of Kelly Trac-
tor Co. v. Jarrell,0 affectionately referred to by practitioners as the
"hand-holding" decision. In Kelly, it was recognized that an attor-
ney's responsibility includes advising and counselling his client, but
that the employer-carrier should not be penalized in those cases in
which claimant is a "worrier" who needs constant reassurance and
"hand-holding." It was held that excessive hours spent "hand-
holding" should be discounted when considering the award of rea-
sonable attorney's fees.2 It is apparent from these decisions that the
present emphasis on the benefits achieved is no real talisman in
determining reasonable attorney's fees.
What are the relative grades of inexperience, and what is a
reasonable hourly rate? What is a reasonable number of hours in
any particular case, and what amount of time spent with a client is
"average"? What is a reasonable attorney's fee for the exceptionally
skilled expert who, with little effort, achieves great success, as com-
pared to the average practitioner who with many times the number
of hours obtains a lesser degree of success? R.H. Coody & Asso-
ciates, Inc. v. Shelton22 held that the award of an attorney's fee to
a skilled practitioner who obtained an excellent result with approxi-
mately forty hours of work was per se excessive where the fee came
out to $325 per hour.
C. Sufficiency of Findings and Evidence
The previous, sometimes cavalier approach to the attorney's fee
issue has, in accordance with recent decisional law, gone by the
wayside. Where the issue is determined by the trial judge, practi-
tioners must present the proper predicating evidence. In addition,
the trial judge must make necessary findings which substantiate the
ultimate determination.
Thus, where parties have agreed to handle presentation of ex-
pert opinions concerning a reasonable attorney's fee through affida-
vits, they must be careful that the affidavits are filed with requests
that they be placed into evidence; that the affidavits are certified
as being served on opposing counsel; and that the affidavits are
actually placed in evidence.23 Even where this procedure is followed,
20. I.R.C. Order 2-3018 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Aug. 19, 1976), cert. denied, 348 So.
2d 949 (Fla. 1977).
21. Id. at5.
22. 352 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1977).
23. R&K Constr. Co. v. Golden, I.R.C. Order 2-2931 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Mar. 5,
1976)(S).
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parties should still reserve the right to challenge the affidavits.
Where this was not done, it was nevertheless held that the trial
judge, upon receipt of affidavits which were admitted into evidence,
must notify opposing counsel as to their receipt, their admission
into evidence and afford counsel the opportunity to thereafter chal-
lenge the affidavits."4
A significant factor in the determination as to the amount of
an attorney's fee is the time involved. Where the time is specified
by affidavit, counsel must be sure officially to offer and to admit the
affidavit into evidence, or a significant factor predicating the award
of attorney's fees is absent, and the award of a fee may not be
sustained.25 In addition, the services involved should be reasonably
identified or the particular award may not be sustained."
It is incumbent upon the trial judge, particularly where a sub-
stantial fee is awarded, to make adequate findings referring to which
factors were considered and the significance of each in reaching the
particular determination. The findings should track the reasoning
which led to the ultimate determination. 7 Even though the deter-
mination may be supported by competent, substantial evidence, if
the Industrial Relations Commission is not satisfied with the extent
of the findings and reasoning, the cause can be remanded for a re-
determination.2
It is apparent from recent decisional law that the presentation
of evidence in connection with attorney's fees requires a degree of
care similar to that exercised in connection with the presentation of
the case on merits. In addition, a substantial attorney's fee requires
a degree of findings which now seems to exceed the degree of find-
ings necessary in connection with other issues.
D. Benefits Considered
An individual who is found permanently and totally disabled
is entitled to supplemental benefits amounting to an additional
increment of five percent per year.29 These benefits are paid by the
24. Rowe & Mitchell v. Rodgers, I.R.C. Order 2-3091 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Jan. 11,
1977), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1977).
25. BCC Brevard v. Pickleseimer, I.R.C. Order 2-3098 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Jan. 27,
1977)(S).
26. Volpe v. Sirozotti & Natale Nobili Constr. Co., I.R.C. Order 2-3171 (Fla. Indus. Rel.
Comm'n May 31, 1977)(S); McDonough Constr. Co. v. Cavender, I.R.C. Order 2-2921 (Fla.
Indus. Rel. Comm'n Feb. 6, 1976)(S) (fee reversed where there was no showing of time and
effort).
27. Volpe v. Sirozotti & Natale Nobili Constr. Co., I.R.C. Order 2-3171 (Fla. Indus. Rel.
Comm'n May 31, 1977)(S); McDonald's Drive-In v. Shrewsberry, I.R.C. Order 2-3144 (Fla.
Indus. Rel. Comm'n Apr. 22, 1977)(S).
28. Vargas v. Americana of Bal Harbour, 345 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 1977).
29. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(1)(e) (1977).
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Workmen's Compensation Administrative Trust Fund and not by
the particular or his insurance carrier. Rather, they are obtained
on behalf of the claimant and may represent very substantial
amounts.
In City of St. Cloud v. Maloy,30 the issue was presented as to
whether the award of an attorney's fee should contemplate consider-
ation of permanent total disability benefits obtained through the
efforts of claimant's counsel, but which benefits were not paid by
the particular employer-carrier. The trial judge excluded those ben-
efits from consideration. The Industrial Relations Commission re-
versed, and the majority opinion stated: "Such benefits clearly
would not have accrued to the employee but for the efforts of counsel
resulting in an award of permanent and total disability compensa-
tion."'31 The dissenting opinion acknowledged that to be the case but
approached the issue by emphasizing the fact that the employer-
carrier did not make those payments nor were those supplemental
benefits specifically awarded by the trial judge.32 The reasoning of
both opinions seems correct, with the majority opinion perhaps rep-
resenting a sounder determination of an admittedly difficult ques-
tion. The benefits are, in fact, indirectly paid by the general com-
munity of employers through an additional levy, and the benefits
are intended to flow automatically upon declaration of claimant's
disability. These facts would seem to favor the result reached by the
majority. As an aside, the Industrial Relations Commission has held
that there is no authority for the assessment of an award for attor-
ney's fees against the Workmen's Compensation Administrative
Trust Fund.3
In the recent case of Ohio Casualty Group v. Parrish, 3 a reason-
able attorney's fee was held to be due because of the review of an
equitable distribution order sought by the employer-carrier in
connection with its claim of lien in a third-party case. The court
stated: "The conduct of the petitioner [carrier] in the instant cause
falls squarely within both the policy considerations of Section
440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1975), calling upon it to pay respon-
dents' attorney's fees and the expressed language of that statutory
30. I.R.C. Order 2-2935 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Mar. 12, 1976), cert. denied, 348 So.
2d 945 (Fla. 1977).
31. Id. at 2.
32. Id. at 4.
33. Florida Dep't of Commerce v. Taylor, I.R.C. Order 2-3189 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n
July 6, 1977); Florida Dep't of Commerce v. Fields, I.R.C. Order 2-3140 (Fla. Indus. Rel.
Comm'n Apr. 21, 1977)(S).
34. 350 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1977).
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provision."3 The result is clearly in accordance with the spirit and
philosophy of the attorney's fee section, but does not "clearly" fall
within the expressed language. The expressed language requires
payment of reasonable attorney's fees in connection with resistance
or failure to pay compensation benefits." In Parrish, the resistance
was not to payment of compensation benefits (which had already
been paid), the resistance was to accepting a lesser share of the
"third-party pie" than that awarded by the trial court. Were the
determination to the contrary, however, it could undermine the
employee's resistance to the demands of the carrier for the proceeds
of a third-party case, because then the employee would be required
to pay any additional attorney's fees in order to resist those unjusti-
fied demands.
III. ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
The legal conclusion that a claim or injury did or did not "arise
out of and in the course of employment ' 37 is often utilized without
specifically expressing the exact reasoning for the conclusion. Re-
cent decisions in this area seem to fall within one of three categories:
(1) deviation cases; (2) volunteer cases; and (3) work causal relation
cases.
In the first category, decisions frequently hold that an employee
is not entitled to benefits on the ground of a deviation from employ-
ment. Unfortunately, the decisions are not precise in articulating
the various kinds of deviations or the grounds for holding that a
particular claim does not arise out of and in the course of employ-
ment. The result is that the concept of a deviation is often used
merely as a legal label justifying a further categorization that the
claim does not arise out of and in the course of employment.
An example of a "time" deviation occurred when an employee
decided, for personal reasons, to remain on his employer's premises
well after his work had been completed. It was held that a reasona-
ble time had expired for the claimant-employee to leave the prem-
ises and that an injury, suffered many hours after quitting time, did
not "arise out of and in the course of employment."38 Another exam-
ple of "time" deviation was where an employee, while geographi-
cally within the locus of his employment, tripped on his way home
after a personal late night spree and was injured. The claim was
35. Id. at 470.
36. FLA. STAT. § 440.34(1) (1977).
37. See id. § 440.02(6).




denied on the grounds that the injury did not arise out of and in the
course of his employment."
A deviation is often thought of as a geographical departure from
a work mission for personal reasons. In Rex Transmissions, Inc. v.
Weintraub,4 a "personal" deviation occurred when a claimant-
employee, while on a work task, drove through a radar net and fled
from the scene. When the claimant was finally apprehended, he was
far afield of his original destination and purpose. An award of bene-
fits was reversed on the grounds that there had been a substantial
personal deviation. On the other hand, changing lanes to stop and
pick up a hitchhiker was held not the kind of "personal" deviation
contemplated as exculpating the employer-carrier from responsibil-
ity for benefits." Accordingly, benefits in that situation were found
due on the grounds that there was no deviation of a substantial
nature.
Although never so articulated, negligence concepts have often
been applied to what, for want of better terminology, can be referred
to as the "task" deviation cases. Generally, workmen's compensa-
tion benefits are granted without consideration of fault, unless there
are specific statutory defenses such as willful intent to injure oneself
or intoxication. Nevertheless, the concepts of fault and contributory
negligence have-filtered into the workmen's compensation law under
the label of a "deviation," as a basis for denying entitlement to
benefits.
In the unreported decision in Yanez v. Premix-Marbletrite
Co.,4" the claimant-employee threw a fake snake at a co-employee.
The latter jumped from the vehicle he was operating and the unat-
tended vehicle ran over claimant-employee, seriously injuring him.
There was no question that claimant-employee was at fault and that
his action significantly contributed to his injury. It was held he
should not recover benefits on the ground that he deviated from his
employment. Accordingly, the injury did not arise out of and in the
course of employment.
A more passive, yet not faultless, situation occurred in the case
of E.M. Watkins & Co. v. Bouie.43 The employee therein went into
39. Demarest v. Jackson, I.R.C. Order 2-3107 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Feb. 3, 1977),
cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1977).
40. I.R.C. Order 2-3238 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Sept. 28, 1977)(S).
41. Florsheim Shoe Co. v. Asberry, I.R.C. Order 2-3234 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Sept.
22, 1977)(S).
42. Form affirmances by the Industrial Relations Commission are not assigned a decision
number. This decision can best be identified as claim no. 266-17-6162 (Fla. Indus. Rel.
Comm'n May 14, 1976), cert. denied, 344 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1977).
43. I.R.C. Order 2-3008 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n July 29, 1976), cert. denied, 344 So.
2d 323 (Fla. 1977).
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a restricted area of the premises in order to sleep and was subse-
quently electrocuted. Benefits were denied on the ground that the
employee deviated from her employment. On the other hand, no
deviation was found where a seemingly diligent employee, without
any instructions, though absent any notion of fault, took a type-
writer home to do some work and was injured in connection there-
with."
The second category of cases which may not arise out of and in
the course of employment are the "volunteer" cases. In this cate-
gory, an employee who was asked to pick up his supervisor and was
injured while doing so, was held to be undertaking a personal task
and accordingly not entitled to workmen's compensation benefits."
Where a teacher, however, not under contract, was injured while
attending a class required as a prerequisite to rehiring, the injury
was held compensable. 6
Recent decisional law indicates that teachers may hold a fa-
vored position in workmen's compensation law. In Schisel v. Levy
County School Board,'7 a faculty member was injured while partici-
pating in a faculty game held in connection with a senior prom. The
accident was held to be compensable. This same disposition, how-
ever, does not extend to all public employees. A policeman who was
injured at a party at the police chief's house was held not entitled
to benefits on the rationale that attendance was solely a voluntary
task.'"
Dade County Board of County Commissioners v. Picherello,"
involved a Dade County police officer who was required to carry
firearms at all times by Dade County regulations. The officer was
at the Broward County Airport and was injured when he came to
the assistance of Broward police authorities who were apprehending
a suspect. The majority opinion held that the injury did not arise
out of and in the course of claimant's employment with Dade
County, but that there was an implied contract with Broward
County pursuant to which workmen's compensation benefits would
be obtained. Notwithstanding language to the contrary, the decision
44. Acousti Eng'r Co. v. Bailey, I.R.C. Order 2-3224 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Sept 6,
1977), cert. denied, - So. 2d - (Fla. 1978).
45. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Makepeace, I.R.C. Order 2-2858 (Fla. Indus. Rel.
Comm'n Oct. 10, 1975)(S).
46. Williams v. Lumpkin, I.R.C. Order 2-3009 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n July 29, 1976),
cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1977).
47. I.R.C. Order 2-3056 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Oct. 29, 1976)(S).
48. City of South Daytona v. Mathias, I.R.C. Order 2-2983 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n
June 16, 1976), cert. denied, 350 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1977).
49. I.R.C. Order 2-3163 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n May 20, 1977).
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may well have rested upon the determination of the primarily re-
sponsible party. Absent an appropriate responsible party, it could
well have been held to be an injury arising out of and in the course
of claimant's employment with Dade County. In a well-reasoned
concurring opinion, Commissioner Canaday noted: "For the em-
ployer to require or even encourage the activity which led to the
injury and then deny after the injury that the activity was within
the scope of employment is not only legally insupportable but is
inequitable as well."50
The employer should not be permitted to have it both ways.
Undoubtedly, the employer can limit the geographical or other
boundaries of employment, but the explicit or implicit responsibili-
ties of the employment should then be so limited. Thus, it is incon-
sistent to require a police officer to carry a firearm at all times, with
the obvious purpose being the possible use of it in appropriate situa-
tions, and yet deny coverage when he complies with that purpose.
It is also inconsistent to grant benefits to a teacher who partici-
pates in a faculty game while denying benefits to a police officer who
attends a party with co-employees at the police chief's home. Em-
ployment realities often allow no valid distinction between volun-
tary or required activities. An employee seeking to enhance or even
to retain his employment would be ill-advised to disregard what the
law may view as "invitations" from superiors. This category of
"volunteer" cases is rife with inconsistencies. Hopefully, future de-
cisions will establish some workable principles.
The final category of course of employment decisions encom-
passes the work-cause-related cases. A recent leading case is
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. McCook,5 where an
employee was on a toilet in the bathroom during a regular break,
and when she bent over for some toilet tissue she felt a pain in her
back. She was subsequently diagnosed as having suffered a her-
niated intervertebral disc. The court seemed to question, but ulti-
mately accepted, the fact that the claimant satisfied the prerequis-
ites of an industrial "accident" and that it occurred "in the course
of" employment; injuries occurring during a break necessitated by
normal bodily functions have long been held compensable. The
court, however, held that this injury did not "arise out of" the
employment: "There was no causal connection whatsoever between
the employment and the aggravation. She simply made a normal
movement which, due solely to her idiopathic [preexisting] condi-
50. Id. at 14.
51. 355 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1977).
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tion, produced disability." 2 What would be the result if the em-
ployee, while at her work station, had bent over to pick up some
papers? The court's rationale and language would seem to indicate
that in such a situation the injury would still be noncompensable.
This unusual case, however, presented "weak" fact situation (that
the injury occurred during a break coupled with the nature of the
activity) and a questionable causal relationship (the preexisting
physical condition of the claimant), all of which appears to have
contributed to the holding of noncompensability.
Analysis of the legal vehicle selected as the basis for denying
benefits-doing a normal activity-is clearly unsound. Synthesis of
this decision with previous decisions leaves the law in such a state
that injuries resulting from certain normal movements, such as
bending to pick up toilet paper from the floor, are noncompensable,
whereas injuries resulting from other normal movements, for exam-
ple readjusting a girdle, can result in compensation recovery.53
IV. MEDICAL CARE
The employer-carrier is required to "furnish to the employee
such remedial treatment, care, and attendance . . as the nature
of the injury or the process of recovery may require, including medi-
cines, crutches, artificial members, and other apparatus."'54
A. Medical Treatment
The primary issues that arise concerning medical treatment
involve the respective obligations of the parties where a change of
physician or additional medical care is sought. Recent decisions in
this area have clarified each party's respective responsibility.
Where a particular physician has been authorized to treat the
employee and the employee requests a change of physician, "it is
then incumbent upon the employer to provide another physician, or
obtain a ruling from the Judge of Industrial Claims that the change
was not for the best interest of the claimant."5 Absent an em-
ployer's authorization of other medical care, the claimant may seek
such care and assert the responsibility of the employer-carrier by
showing that the care was reasonable and necessary. This naturally
52. Id. at 1169.
53. See Jernigan's Studio v. Hopewell, 7 F.C.R. 38 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n 1972)(S)
(compensable injury occurred when claimant pulled up her girdle in the bathroom and felt a
sudden pain in her back).
54. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(1) (1977).




assumes compliance with the requirement regarding filing of requi-
site medical reports within ten days of first treatment."6 Where the
employer does provide the claimant with another physician or phy-
sicians, it is then incumbent upon the claimant to proceed before
the judge of industrial claims seeking authorization for the particu-
lar physician or physicians."7
Generally, a failure by the employer-carrier to provide claimant
with medical care (including a change of physician) opens the door
for the employee to obtain treatment at the expense of the employer.
This employer liability, however, is apparently qualified as a practi-
cal matter by considerations of cost and geographical area. Where
an expensive or an unusual type of care is being sought, unless it
is an absolute emergency,5" the employee must seek the prior ap-
proval of a judge of industrial claims even where the requested care
has been denied."
Where a physician has been authorized by either the employer
or carrier, the issue often arises as to the ability of the employer-
carrier to unilaterally seek a change of physician. Where there has
been an initial authorization by the employer, responsibility lies
with him for payment of the physician's bill until such authoriza-
tion is revoked and other suitable medical care is afforded to the
claimant."0 If a physician has been authorized and the care is ac-
ceptable to the claimant, and change in treatment should be au-
thorized by a judge in order to assure that the change is in the best
interest of all concerned. The relationship of the attending physi-
cian and the claimant should not be interrupted at whim, nor
56. [NIor shall any claim for medical, surgical, or other remedial treatment
be valid and enforceable unless within 10 days following the first treatment (ex-
cept in cases where first-aid only is rendered), and thereafter at such intervals as
the division by regulation may prescribe, the physician or other recognized practi-
tioner giving such treatment or treatments furnishes to the division and to em-
ployer, or to the carrier if the employer is not self-insured, a report of such injury
and treatment on forms prescribed by the division, provided that a judge of
industrial claims for good cause may excuse the failure of the physician or other
recognized practitioner to furnish any report within the period prescribed and
may order the payment to such employee of such remuneration for treatment or
service rendered as the judge of industrial claims finds equitable.
FLA. STAT. § 440.13 (1977).
57. See First of Hialeah Bldg. v. Evans, I.R.C. Order 2-3134 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n
Apr. 12, 1977)(S); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Enos, I.R.C. Order 2-3045 (Fla. Indus. Rel.
Comm'n Oct. 12, 1976)(S).
58. Food Fair Stores v. Hessler, I.R.C. Order 2-3159 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n May 18,
1977)(S).
59. Moomaw v. H-Y Fabricators, I.R.C. Order 2-3236 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Sept.
22, 1977).
60. Zins v. Saxony Hotel, I.R.C. Order 2-2979 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n June 11, 1976),
remanded on other grounds, 343 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1977).
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should the law encourage shopping for medical treatment more sat-
isfactory to the employer-carrier.
B. Nursing Care
Recent decisions reiterate the established rule"' that the serv-
ices of a member of the immediate family are presumptively gratui-
tous. Generally, the decisions involve services of a wife to her in-
jured spouse, with the issue being whether the extent of the services
are sufficient to qualify as nursing-attendance care.
Solomon Construction Co. v. Jackson"2 involved services of a
wife to her blinded husband: administering insulin shots and watch-
ing for a reaction; giving pills for hypertension; and transporting
him. The award to the wife, compensating her for fourteen hours per
week at two dollars per hour, was reversed on the grounds that the
services were not such as to overcome the presumption of gratui-
tousness. Similarly, in Florida Department of Transportation v.
Cato,63 an award to the wife was reversed on the grounds that ser-
vices were not such as to overcome the presumption of gratuitous-
ness. The case involved a sixty year old male with a serious leg
fracture and a loss of balance due to inner ear injury. The attending
physician felt attendance care was necessary: (1) to prevent claim-
ant from hurting himself; (2) to provide him with medication; and
(3) to take care of his basic needs such as using the bathroom. The
trial judge determined the need for attendance care based upon
testimony of the attending physician and the obvious realities of
life."4 With impaired balance and a serious leg fracture, the claimant
obviously needed assistance just to carry out customary bodily func-
tions and medically necessary hygiene. The required continual at-
tendance is not in the same category as the attendance necessary
to give an insulin shot or to give a pill for hypertension. The required
attendance signifiantly affected the ability of the wife to work and
significantly affected her prior life style. On appeal, it was held that
claimant did not show a sufficient need for attendance care after he
was released from the hospital. 5 The holding considerably narrows
the area of compensable care.
61. See, e.g., Green v. Maule Indus., Inc., 2 F.C.R. 142 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n 1956).
62. I.R.C. Order 2-2998 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n July 21, 1976), cert. denied, 342 So.
2d 1102 (Fla. 1976).
63. I.R.C. Order 2-3138 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Apr. 14, 1977), cert. denied, 351 So.
2d 405 (Fla. 1977).
64. Id. at 4-5.
65. id. at 6.
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Determination of the need for care in this area should not hinge
on the loving nature of the spouse. Rather, the determination of
entitlement (as opposed to the amount of compensation) should be
the same whether or not the claimant is married or has a family;
the presence and lovingness of a spouse, however, may well be a
basis for a lesser rate of compensation. Where injury has occurred
necessitating additional care, compensability should not be deter-
mined solely upon the presence or absence of loved ones.
Where nursing care is found to be necessary, no penalties on
past due nursing are appropriate.6 Also, where the need for nursing
or attendance care flows from both occupational and nonoccupa-
tional injuries, only the care in connection with the occupational
injury may be compensated. 7 Where nursing or attendance care is
due, payments should be made directly to the attendant.
C. Other Medical and Medically Related Benefits
Where it is necessary to treat a preexisting condition in order
to treat the compensable injury properly, the employer-carrier is
responsible for treatment of both conditions. Thus, where obesity
was hindering treatment for a compensable knee injury, the
employer-carrier was held responsible for providing the claimant
with mandibular immobilization to reduce the obesity. Where an
air conditioning unit was provided to an employee who suffered a
heart attack, pursuant to a medical recommendation, the payment
of expenses incurred, including electric bills and repairs, was held
approriatez° Travel to a drug store for prescriptions, however, is not
reimbursable travel.7
V. SPECIFIC INJURIES
Wooldridge v. City of Miami72 involved a fireman who claimed
to have suffered a heart attack arising out of and in the course of
66. Swift & Co. v. Kessler, I.R.C. Order 2-3102 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Jan. 31, 1977),
cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1977).
67. Id.
68. See Sanderlin & Assoc. v. Crews, I.R.C. Order 2-3214 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Aug.
10, 1977). In addition, the bill should be submitted by whomever is performing those services.
Southern Steel Erectors v. Pate, I.R.C. Order 2-3026 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Sept. 1,
1976)(S).
69. Washburn v. Royal Castle Sys., Inc., I.R.C. Order 2-3104 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n
Jan. 31, 1977)(S).
70. Electric Constr. Co. v. Capps, I.R.C. Order 2-3205 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n July
25, 1977)(S).
71. Id.
72. I.R.C. Order 2-3007 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n July 28, 1976), cert. denied, 351 So.
2d 405 (Fla. 1977).
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his employment. The claim was based upon conflicting medical
opinions as to causal origin and was denied by the trial judge. The
case involved application of the workmen's compensation law, sec-
tion 112.18 of the Florida Statutes, providing that heart disease
sustained by a fireman "shall be presumed to have been accidental
and to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be
shown by competent evidence." 3 The trial judge found that the
evidence presented by the employer was competent and sufficient
to overcome this statutory povision. The Industrial Relations Com-
mission reversed, stating that the presumption may not be over-
come by a medical statement that the heart disease was not causally
related to the employment. It is unclear as to the quality, if any,
of medical testimony which will be sufficient to overcome this statu-
tory presumption applying to fire fighters.
In connection with claims for permanent total disability, where
it is clear from the disabling nature of the injury that a search for
work would be fruitless, the employee may not be so required to
act." However, where the disabling nature of the injuries does not
clearly render the claimant permanently and totally disabled, the
claimant must seek employment within his or her capability"6 and
physical limitations."
VI. MAXIMUM MEDICAL IMPROVEMENT AND TEMPORARY BENEFITS
Under section 440.15 of the Florida Statutes, payment of tem-
porary total disability compensation must now be reduced by the
amount of unemployment compensation received during any simi-
lar week.78 Prior to this statutory amendment, the law allowed for
recovery of both unemployment compensation benefits and tempo-
rary disability benefits during the same period of time. 9
The date of maximum medical improvement, which fixes the
conclusion of temporary benefits and the commencement of perma-
nent disability benefits, occurs when the healing period is over ac-
73. FLA. STAT. § 112.18(1) (1977).
74. Wooldridge v. City of Miami, I.R.C. Order 2-3007 at 4-5.
75. See General Elec. Co. v. Hughes, I.R.C. Order 2-3216 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Aug.
16, 1977).
76. Id.; Florida Cuttings, Inc. v. Garcia, I.R.C. Order 2-3170 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n
May 31, 1977), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1977); Harris v. Anderson, I.R.C. Order 2-
3068 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Nov. 18, 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1977).
77. Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, I.R.C. Order 2-3063 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Nov. 12,
1976)(S).
78. FLA. STAT. § 440.15 (1977).




cording to reasonable medical probability. In fixing the date of max-
imum medical improvement, the trial judge must make the best
determination based upon the evidence presented. When the only
evidence presented is that the employee's maximum medical im-
provement occurred by the time of a particular medical examina-
tion, the trial judge may fix the date as the time of that examina-
tion, although the improvement may well have occurred somewhat
earlier.8 0 Where an employee fails to cooperate with medical recom-
mendations and there would be no further improvement without
that cooperation, the trial judge may determine that the point of
maximum medical improvement has been reached."
Where an employee has multiple injuries and has reached max-
imum medical improvement regarding one injury, it is error to
commence payment of permanent benefits until overall maximum
medical improvement has been achieved.82 However, where further
temporary benefits are not due, it has been suggested that perma-
nent benefits should commence when any of the multiple injuries




Matters in this area can best be categorized as: (1) general
procedural decisions; (2) findings of fact; and (3) rules of procedure.
Practitioners must increasingly give careful attention to procedural
aspects, both at the trial and appellate levels, in properly represent-
ing their clients.
A. General Procedural Decisions
It is error for the trial judge to determine issues other than those
appropriately presented. Thus, if the parties have agreed to try the
issue of compensability, it is error to make any determination be-
yond the particular benefits due. 4 This is equally true in connection
with particular benefits to be determined. Where remedial treat-
ment is not requested, it is error for the trial judge to deny entitle-
80. See Eden Roc Hotel v. Tamarit, I.R.C. Order 2-3111 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Feb.
18, 1977).
81. Murphy v. Walsh, I.R.C. Order 2-3086 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Jan, 4, 1977), cert.
denied, 351 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1977).
82. Thompson v. Arnold Cellophane Corp., I.R.C. Order 2-3029 (Fla. Indus. Rel.
Comm'n Sept. 2, 1976)(S).
83. Arkin Constr. Co. v. Benninger, I.R.C. Order 2-2429 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Sept.
25, 1973), cert. denied, 292 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 1977).
84. See Adams Packing Assoc. v. Reeves, I.R.C. Order 2-3139 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n
Apr. 20, 1977), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1977).
1978]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ment to it." Also, it is error to make a determination as to perma-
nent disability benefits where no claim is pending for the benefits."6
The above decisions should be considered in conjunction with
recent determinations that a claimant may withdraw his claim from
the adjudicatory process until he has "rested" his case. 7 Thus, if
things are going badly, the claimant may, until he has rested, with-
draw the claim and come back another day. This rule, however,
applies only to the point of resting the case in chief.8
Where an incomplete record is presented to the Industrial Rela-
tions Commission, the order should be affirmed on the grounds the
record is not sufficiently complete to determine error. In Southern
Mill Creek Products v. Bellamy, 9 the majority took this view and
affirmed the order below, whereas the dissent took the view that the
order should have been reversed since the record was too incomplete
to show the order was supported by competent substantial evidence.
The Industrial Relations Commission has held that in the exer-
cise of its discretion it will not review interlocutory orders." How-
ever, the recent case of Prestressed Systems, Inc. v. Moser' would
seem to compel counsel to seek review of a particular order at the
time it is entered absent a previous pronouncement dealing with the
specific issue. In this case, the Industrial Relations Commission
categorized an order entered requiring the payment of cost of a
transcript of record as "basically an interlocutory one." 2 But it was
held that this was the type of interlocutory order which should have
been immediately reviewed rather than being reviewed pursuant to
a final order.
B. Findings of Fact
The necessary findings of fact in support of any determination
must be supported by competent substantial evidence. The extent
85. Thompson v. Citrus Central, Inc., I.R.C. Order 2-3124 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n
Mar. 10, 1977)(S).
86. Long v. Howard Johnson's Buena Vista, I.R.C. Order 2-3108 (Fla. Indus. Rel.
Comm'n Feb. 14, 1977)(S).
87. Orlando v. Exxon Co., I.R.C. Order 2.3040 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Sept. 22,
1976)(S).
88. See Hamman v. Churchman Tower Serv., I.R.C. Order 2-3083 (Fla. Indus. Rel.
Comm'n Dec. 29, 1976)(S).
89. I.R.C. Order 2-3210 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Aug. 2, 1977)(S).
90. City of Tampa v. Carnegie, I.R.C. Order 2-3243 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Oct. 3,
1977)(S); Pepsi-Cola Co. v. Horn, I.R.C. Order 2-3130 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Apr. 7,1977),
cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1977); Clark v. City of Dunedin, I.R.C. Order 2-3128 (Fla.
Indus. Rel. Comm'n Apr. 4, 1977)(S).
91. I.R.C. Order 2-3154 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n May 16, 1977).
92. Id. at 2.
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of required findings of fact has a direct correlation with the discre-
tion of the trier of facts in determining a cause. A previous statutory
amendment 3 and decisions interpreting it," greatly limiting the
required findings of fact, seem to have been significantly diluted.
Where an award is based upon the claimant's demonstration of
the nature of his injury, it is incumbent upon the trial judge to state
what he has observed. 5 As a general rule, where the award is in
excess of any anatomical rating, whether it be a scheduled injury
or loss of earning capacity, the trial judge must carefully express his
reasons for supporting the ultimate result." An order dismissing a
cause must contain sufficient findings of fact to apprise the parties
of the basis for the ruling. 7 Where findings of fact regarding accept-
ance of the opinions of one physician over that of another were
deemed inadequate, the Industrial Relations Commission re-
manded the cause for appropriate findings and redetermination."
Necessary findings regarding attorney's fees may now be greater
than in any other area.9
The Supreme Court of Florida has approved the remand of
cases by the Industrial Relations Commission for further clarifica-
tion of the findings, notwithstanding the existence of competent
substantial evidence supporting other aspects of the case.99 In Buro
v. Dino's Southland Meats, '" the Supreme Court of Florida reversed
a remand and stated: "that decision [Schaefer v. Saint Anthony's
Hospital] cannot constitute authority for indiscriminate remands
to the Judge of Industrial Claims where the record contains compe-
tent substantial evidence."''0
These recent decisions reflect enhanced requirements as to
findings of fact. The final standard is still unclear and it is suggested
that the extent of required findings will remain somewhat fluid.
93. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(3)(c) (1977) (originally enacted as 1967 Fla. Laws, ch. 67-374).
94. See Pierce v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 279 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1973); Brown v. Griffin, 229
So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1969).
95. See Rohan Assocs., Inc. v. Williams, I.R.C. Order 2-2828 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n
Aug. 12, 1975)(S).
96. See Moses v. Lin Drake Farm, I.R.C. Order 2-3193 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n July
11, 1977)(S); Willingston Welding Fabricating Co. v. Brooks, I.R.C. Order 2-3167 (Fla. Indus.
Rel. Comm'n May 25, 1977)(S); Helene Transp. v. Levy, I.R.C. Order 2-2848 (Fla. Indus. Rel.
Comm'n Sept. 30, 1975)(S); Alhambra Dev. v. Gonzalez, I.R.C. Order 2-2818 (Fla. Indus. Rel.
Comm'n July 21, 1975), cert. denied, 330 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1977).
97. See Ray v. Corbett Motor Supply, Inc., I.R.C. Order 2-3028 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n
Sept. 2, 1976)(S).
98. Shores Enterprises, Inc. v. Branny, I.R.C. Order 2-3256 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n
Oct. 20, 1977)(S).
99. See text accompanying notes 21 & 22 supra.
100. Schaefer v. Saint Anthony's Hosp., 327 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1976).
101. 354 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1978).
102. Id. at 877.
19781
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
C. Rules of Procedure
New workmen's compensation rules of procedure were ap-
proved by the Supreme Court of Florida, effective date July 1,
1977.03 The significant changes are as follows:
Rule 7. Application for Hearing
In applying for a hearing, the issues sought to be determined
shall be stated concisely in separate numbered paragraphs. The first
request for hearing shall be filed with the Bureau in Tallahassee,
and subsequent requests shall be filed with the judge of industrial
claims. A copy of any application is required to be served upon the
opposing counsel or party. Failure to serve a copy of the application
as required shall be grounds for a continuance or cancellation of the
hearing.
Rule 9. Discovery
Depositions may be taken prior to the institution of a claim, but
only if the claimant is represented by an attorney. After the filing
of a claim, a deposition may be taken in the same manner and for
the same purposes as provided in the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.
Rule 10. Pretrial Procedure
This is an entirely new rule and adds a new dimension to work-
men's compensation proceedings. The trial judge may schedule a
pretrial conference, or upon motion of any party order a pretrial
conference..Fifteen days' notice is required. An order is required to
be entered in connection with the pretrial conference. The order is
to be served upon the parties and "shall control the subsequent
course of the action unless the Judge modifies it to prevent injus-
tice." 04
Rule 11. Prosecution of Claims Before Judge of Industrial
Claims
This also is an entirely new rule making significant changes. All
parties must diligently prosecute and defend the claim. The pre-
vious rule required only the claimant to diligently prosecute the
claim. Now a hearing may be cancelled by a party and the cause
continued only "for good cause which has not resulted from a lack
of diligence in the prosecution or defense of the claim."''0
The rule also provides for dismissal of a pending claim after a
hearing thereon where "no action has been taken by request for
103. In re Workmen's Compensation Rules of Procedure, 343 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 1977) (per
curiam).




hearing, filing of pleadings, order of Judge, payment of compensa-
tion, provision of medical care, or otherwise for a period of two years
after filing."'0 6 Where there has been no prosecution, upon the filing
of a motion to dismiss, the claim will be dismissed, "unless a party
shows good cause why the claim or petition should remain pend-
ing."'1
07
Rule 16. Record on Appeal
The primary change under Rule 16 provides for an abbreviated
record. This allows the appellant to file designations regarding the
particular portions of the proceedings to be included in the record.
Within ten days after service, the opposing party may file cross-
designations. The obvious purpose of the rule is to allow the parties
to reduce the size and cost of the record where only a few issues are
raised on appeal, requiring only limited portions of the record.
The time for payment of costs or the filing of a petition to be
relieved of costs has been reduced from twenty days to fifteen days
after service of notificaton of costs. However, since service is invaria-
bly accomplished by mail (which pursuant to Rule 3(b) allows an
additional five days after the date of mailing), the time allowed is
essentially the same as under the previous rule. The petition to be
relieved of costs must be filed with the judge along with an informa-
tional copy for the Bureau. It must be verified and the appellant or
his attorney must include as a part of the verified petition "an
affidavit or affirmation that, in his opinion, the Application for
Review was filed in good faith and that the assignment of error
contained therein constitutes a probable basis for the Commission
to find reversible error."'"8 Failure to attach the required certifica-
tion would result in a defective petition which would not suffice to
toll the time for payment of the costs and could result in dismissal
of the appeal.' 9 Upon denial of the petition, the fifteen day period
for depositing the costs commences to run."'
An insolvency petition may be filed with the judge of industrial
claims with a copy served upon the Bureau in Tallahassee. A copy
must be served upon the other parties. A hearing shall be conducted
with fifteen days' notice to the parties except that "[t]he judge
may enter an order without such hearing if no objection is filed by
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(4)(c)( 2 ) (1977).
109. See South Coast Water Constr. v. Allen, I.R.C. Order 2-3204 (Fla. Indus. Rel.
Comm'n July 22, 1977), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1977) (holding certification as to
reasonable grounds for appeal must be attached to the petition for it to be a valid pleading).
110. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(4)(c) (1977).
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the Division or an interested party within twelve days from the date
the verified petition is filed.""'
Rule 18. Jurisdiction; Proposed Settlement; Motion for Re-
mand
Upon appeal being filed, the judge shall have no further juris-
diction with respect to the cause, except regarding matters pertain-
ing to the record on appeal. "A party may, however, file a motion
with the Commission or Supreme Court requesting remand of the
cause to the Judge for further proceedings.""' Thus, the parties may
proceed with determinations at the trial level while particular issues
are pending at the appellate level."3 Determinations by the In-
dustrial Relations Commission and supreme court ordinarily require
more than one year. During that time, one party may or the other
may require appropriate relief at the trial level." 4
VIII. CONCLUSION
Legislatively, the 1977 workmen's compensation law has ef-
fected few changes in the substantive rights of employee-claimants.
Probably, the most significant change involves the codification of
guidelines pertaining to the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded
in relation to the benefits obtained. Finally, it is apparent from
recent decisions that there has been a narrowing in the range of
compensable consequences and stricter proof and findings require-
ments in connection with the award of particular benefits.
11. In re Workmen's Compensation Rules of Procedure, 343 So. 2d at 1282.
112. Id.
113. McDonald's Drive-In v. Shrewsberry, I.R.C. Order 2-3013 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n
Aug. 3, 1976)(S).
114. Hatch v. City Cab Co., I.R.C. Order 2-3300 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Dec. 21,
1977)(S).
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